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Abstract
Current operating feedback Systems in industry show some limits as, in numerous
industrial companies, thé numbers of events do not decrease anymore and as similar
events seem to recur. Our assumption is that weaknesses corne from analysis
methodology used. After a description of analysis methodology history, we focus on
interest of applying an organisational analysis of events, familiar to scholars but not
yet in industry, and we describe its main characteristics. Then we highlight rôles of
analysts who are not neutral in using event analysis method, assuming that thèse
rôles could be a block to progress of event analyses.
Keywords: Accident, Industrial Safety, Organisational Analysis, Event Root-Causes
1. Introduction
One of thé ordinary goals of high-risk industries is to operate in a safe manner.
Industrial policy for fulfïlling this goal involves, amongst others: safety oriented
equipments design, relevant organisation (i.e. awareness of interactions needs
between company Departments, of staffïng quality and quantity requirement, of
educational background of employées, of training, of . . . ) , compliance with
régulations, ...
This set of measures cannot prevent occurrence of every event1 and high-risk
industries hâve to cope with minor events. In order to learn from thèse events, i.e. for
preventing that thé same or a similar event happens again, industries set up operating
feedback System (OFS) as part of their safety management process. Methodology
used by every OFS generally implies several steps: (i) détection, identification of
event, (ii) data collection, (iii) event analysis - causes finding - , (iv) définition of
corrective measures, (v) decision-making regarding measures, (vi) implementation of
corrective measures, (vii) vérification and validation of corrective measures, (viii)
storage of information dealing with thé treatment of this spécifie event, (ix) diffusion
of information and lessons. Considérable resources are devoted by industries for
running OFS. OFS is one of the pillars of safety management process as it is seen as
an essential tool in thé framework of prévention.
Nevertheless, numerous experts express concerns regarding limits of OFS. It is
getting harder to establish convincing corrective action plans. Indeed, in spite of
substantial efforts put for running OFS, thé same human errors or séries of similar
technical breakdowns seem to recur (Dien and Llory 2004). Once could say that,
concerning safety, industries hâve reached a limit and are "dancing tango on
asymptote" (Frantzen 2004), meaning that numbers of annual safety records are either
slightly higher or slightly lower than thé ones of thé previous year, but are more or
less thé same since several years.
Are we subjected to be satisfied with thèse weaknesses of current OFS? Does
prévention hâve to find new paths? Some specialists implicitly reject event analysis
and advocate either to analyse daily routine situation in order to figure out factors of
opération strengths and reliability (e.g. Rochlin et al. 1987, Laporte and Consolini,
1991) or, at thé opposite side of the spectrum, to be prepared to manage crisis because
accident occurrence is inévitable (e.g. Lagadec 1994).
Fundamental question is: what has to be reappraised? The whole OFS (Dechy and
Dien 2007) ? Event analysis itself or analysis methodology ? Furthermore can we
define analysis methodology only in terms of set of conditions to follow. or to fulfil or
can we extend définition up to rôle and features of thé ones who applied thé
methodology? Indeed, could we consider that implementation of a methodology is
"neutral" disconnected from, for instance, position in thé safety management process
and/or self-interests of persons in charge of carrying out thé analysis, investigation.
After a brief description of analysis méthodologies évolution grounded on a better
understanding of what is an event, what is at stake when dealing with organisational
dimensions of socio-technical Systems, this paper will propose a way to improve
event investigation by thé use of organisational analysis approach and will (try to)
show how rôle of analysts2 is as important as methodology used itself.
1
 By event we mean every type of malfunctioning with effects on either process availability or process
safety: from minor and major incident to accident and disaster and also crisis.
2
 This point is developed further (section 4) but we would like to précise thé importance of the analyst
in thé construction of identification, interprétation and analysis of the Accident..
2. Evolutions of Understanding of What is an Event and What
constitutes Safety
Event investigations intend to figure out causes of event occurrence in order to define
and to implement corrective measures in order to improve safety level of the plant. As
part of thé safety management process, event investigation methodology is closely
linked with thé way safety-related concerns were taken into account. Reason (1993)
described three periods regarding main focus of safety. Wilpert and Fahlbruch (1998)
added a fourth one:
• Technical period: source of problems is technology;
• "Human error" period: source of problem is thé person(s);
• Socio-technical period: source of problem is interaction between social and
technical subsystems;
• Inter-organisational relationship period: source of problem is dysfunctional
relationship between organisations.
Thèse periods are "time-marked" periods, i.e. that vision of safety sources of
problems has changed with time. This évolution can, for example, be seen on thé
nuclear industry.
Through thé '70s safety was mainly based upon technical reliability. Human
Performance (i.e. human capabilities and human weaknesses) was not taken into
account. Mitigation of potential or proven process failures resulted from technical
changes and/or improvements.
During thé '80s, after thé TMI-2 accident, concept of "human error" has emerged. A
positive effect of it is, that "thé operator(s)" was (were) inserted in thé loop of process
opérations. It allowed improvements in domains of human-machine interface and
operating procédures design, of training,... During this décade, "Operational
Feedback" Systems were set-up in order to promote lessons learned. We hâve to
highlight that event analyses were operator-error oriented.
After thé Chernobyl accident, during thé '90s, concept of "Safety Culture" emerged.
The safety culture of a company comprises thé beliefs, behaviours, norms, and work
practices of employées and management as well. Safety culture refers to what an
organisation is like in terms of safety. This concept is of the first importance because
it acknowledges for thé first time that management activities are part of safety process
- it means that managers could be seen, as thé operators, accountable for occurrence
of events -.Nevertheless it is, to us, less operational that it seems. Indeed, according to
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) a safety culture could be
ensured in an enterprise (i) if rôle and responsibilities of everyone are clearly defined
and known and (ii) if thé relevant question is asked at thé right person at thé right
time. In other words, "safety culture" can be seen as thé willingness to work on
behaviour through organisation (INSAG 1991).
In parallel, specially thanks to Reason (1990, 1993, 1997), concept of organisational
event "came into thé world". It widens event analysis potential scope. So, this décade
is moving toward a taking account of "Organisational Factors". From a conceptual
point of view, "Organisational Factors" cover Socio-technical and Inter-
organisational relationship as well.
Results of évolution we briefly described are cumulative, non exclusive - from
"technical aspects" to "human factors" and then to "organisational aspects" - . No-one
aspect has to be ignored in favour of another. This statement can be seen as thé
"Onion skin theory": Approaches (skins) are prioritised from thé core to outsider (i)
technical approach, (ii) human factors approach, (iii) organisational approach. Each
approach gives results, and thé whole set of results allows to hâve a better vision - a
better understanding - of the (causes of occurrence of the) event.
3. Towards an Organisational Analysis of Event
3.1 Status of Event Investigation
Unfortunately, if concept of organisational accident is already familiar to scholars, it
is more récent in industry, and so not applied3. Indeed, it was noticed by thé
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) in its investigation concerning
accident of the space shuttle Columbia occurred on February 1, 2003. CAIB states:
"Many accident investigations do not go far enough4. They identify thé technical
cause of the accident, and then connect it to a variant of "operator error " [ . . . ] . When
thé détermination of the causal chain is limited to thé technical flaw and individual
failure, typically thé action taken [...] are also limited [...]" (CAIB 2003). Due to
flawed analysis, i.e. actual root causes of thé event are not figured out, correctives
measures defined and implemented do not match "requirements" of thé situation and
a "similar" event is ready to (re)occur5.
The CAIB also points out a side effect of a weak analysis: "Putting thèse corrections6
in place leads to another mistake — thé belief that thé problem is solved" (CAIB
2003) As Turner said (1997), this kind of belief about thé world and its hazards are
culturally accepted within thé organisation (i.e. thé company). So, organisation will
live, according to Turner's expression (1997), an incubation period: a period during
which some events occurring will remain unnoticed because they are at odds with
current beliefs about existing hazards7.
Nevertheless, some events were analysed from an organisational point of view:
collision of trains in England (Cullen 2000), loss of Columbia space shuttle (CAIB
2003), accident in a plant manufacturing explosives (Le Coze and Lim 2003),
3
 We do not say that investigation of event within thé industry do not address at ail human and
organisational factors, but, rare are thé investigations which really go beyond technical aspects and
"human error paradigm" and very rare are thé ones which refer to thé organisational analysis paradigm.
4
 Emphasis added.
5
 See for instance similarity between Challenger Space Shuttle and Columbia Space Shuttle accidents
("Echoes of Challenger" in CAIB, 2003).
5
 i.e. fixing thé technical problem and replacement or retraining of the individual responsible.
7
 Using a médical metaphor, we can say that if diagnosis (analysis) is weak (only deals with direct
causes), associated treatment (corrective measures) will only treat symptom(s), not thé disease. For
instance, patient's température will go down and virus is still potentially active. Furthermore as
symptom is deleted, sick person (doctors and physicians as well) will think he/she is in good shape,
while a virus is waiting to act again.
destruction of part of an altemator in a nuclear power plant (Dien and Hofseth 2005),
explosion in a refmery (US CSB 2007).
What is currently at stake, is to define organisational analysis features in a way it
could be disseminated in industry culture.
3.2 Challenging thé Event Chain Analysis Methodology
Currently, event analysis are mainly based upon an Event Chain approach. Event
Chain Analysis methodology aims at directly "Connecting" every single event to its
cause(s). It means "in thé other direction" that every action leads to direct
consequence(s) and yet studies of accidents hâve shown that effects of some décisions
(hère seen as actions) are visible several years after they are made, and thé way
between décisions and consequence(s) is not direct (see for instance Vaughan 1997).
Studies of accidents hâve also shown that factors causing an event are often
interlinked, overlap each other. They can be présent at thé same time with effects of
mutual strengthening or réduction (Dien and Llory 2002).
Some scholars, as Perrow (1984), argue that roots of an accident are embedded in thé
system itself and that ways taken for coming to, reaching occurrence of event are so
complex, that it is almost impossible to describe them by a "set of arrows joining
(single event) boxes".
3.3 Main Assumption
Any event is generated by direct or immédiate causes (technical failure(s) and/or
"human error(s)") nevertheless its occurrence and/or its developing is considered to
be induced, facilitated or accelerated by underlying organisational conditions
(complex factors) (Dien 2006).
3.4 To Understand or To Explain?
Goal of an organisational analysis is not necessarily to explain an event from an
expert point of view resulting in list of (more or less numerous) direct causes leading
to conséquences (with, at thé end thé fatal conséquence). This approach brings some
potential improvements in terms of, for instance, human machine interface, training,
communication procédures (!!), ... Nevertheless, it leaves into shadow context of the
event (i.e. a set a various phenomena as organisation, régulation, général and spécifie
to thé event decision-making processes, company beliefs and culture, . . . ) . Very often
"explaining approach" is operator oriented and takes poorly into account managers
actions (for instance "decision-making") and its rôle in occurrence of event - indeed,
management actions hâve, generally, no direct effects, impacts concerning
occurrence - . In contrast, organisational approach tries to understand events in/by
taking account of context and to highlight its relevant features (i.e. history, every
actor, entity potentially involved, It allows to propose corrective measures with
broader effects. Thèse measures are usually less "technical", and could be related to
cultural aspects and it could take times before their effects are felt.
Purpose of organisational analysis is to understand how organisation is working: it
leads to (try to) understand weaknesses and vulnerabilities of/coming from daily,
routine, day-to-day, ..., functioning.
3.5 Event organisational Analysis Main Features
According to Reason (1997), a System producing an event is made of three levels:
• The person (having carried out thé unsafe acts, thé errors);
• The workplace (local error-provoking conditions);
• The organisation (organisational factors inducing thé event).
Development of event is "bottom-up", i.e. direction causality is from organisational
factors to person. In thé event analysis, direction is opposite. "Gâte" - starting point -
of analysis is direct and immédiate causes of bad outcome (event). Then, step by step,
analysis considers, as far as possible, how and when defences failed.
In addition to results obtained by scholars in thé field of organisational studies, real
event organisational analyses carried out allow us to define thé three main axis of an
innovative approach, helping to go from direct causes to root organisational causes
(Dien and Llory 2006):
• Historical dimension;
• Organisational network;
• "Vertical relationships" in thé organisation.
We hâve to note that, if thèse dimensions are introduced in a independent way, they
are interacting and an analysis has to deal with them in parallel.
a) Historical dimension
As Llory states (1998): "accident does not start with triggering of final accidentai
séquence; therefore, analysis require to go back in time, [...]" in order to put in
prominent place détérioration phenomena. Analysis has to "go upstream" in thé
History of thé organisations involved for highlighting significant malfunctioning
aspects: what was not appreciated in real time has to "make sensé" when risk was
confirmed (i.e. when event has happened). Vaughan reminds (2005): "The O-ring
érosion that caused thé loss of Challenger and thé foam débris problem that took
Columbia out of thé sky both had a long history. " Early warning signs hâve to be
looked for and detected long before time event occurrence.
We hâve to note that one chapter of the CAIB report (2003) is named: "History as A
Cause". Few years before, Presidential Commission on thé Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident (1986) has entitled one chapter of its report: "An Accident Rooted in
History". So taking account of past is important to understand thé event. Goal is to go
back in time for comprehending and analysing relevant processes and trends which'
led to thé event. Numerous industriel events show that weakness of operational
feedback could be incriminated for their occurrence - i.e. that previous relevant
event(s) was/were not taken into account or poorly treated after their occurrence - .
Analysts hâve to pay a spécifie attention at incidents, faults, malfimctioning occurred
prior to thé event.
Analysis of thé "historical dimension" is parallel to detailed examination of
parameters, of variables of context which allow understanding of events.
Analysis of thé "historical dimension" has to avoid a "rétrospective error". Fine
knowledge of event scénario — i.e. séquences of actions and décisions which led to
it - allows to assess actual mid and long term effects of each action and décision.
Analysts hâve to keep in mind that this évaluation is easier to make after thé event
than in real time. In other words, analysts hâve to avoid a blâme approach.
b) Organisational network
Within an organisation, entities8 communicate: they exchange data, they make
common décisions - or at least they discuss for making a décision - , they collaborate,
... So it is of thé first importance to "draw" organisational network between entities
concerned in thé event. This network is not thé formai organisation chart of entities. It
is a tool for showing numerous and complex interactions involved for occurrence of
event. It is a guideline for carrying out thé analysis; it is built ail along analysis itself.
Organisational network is hardly defined once and for ail for a given organisation. It
is draft according to thé analysis goals. Parts of organisation can be ignored because
they were not involved in thé event.
Organisational network allows visualising complexity of functional relationships
between entities, and sometimes, it highlights absence of relationships which had to
be présent.
c) "Vertical relationships" in thé organisation
This dimension is a part of organisational network on which a spécifie focus is
needed. It covers top-down and bottom-up communications. It is essential to isolate it
since it makes easier understanding of interactions between various management
levels, experts and "field operators". We hâve to remind an obviousness often
forgotten during event analysis: organisation is a hierarchical System.
The main interests of this dimension are: modes of relationships, of communication,
of information flows and modes of co-operation between hierarchical layers. Real
events show that détérioration of thèse modes are cause of their occurrence.
At least, thanks to this dimension, causes of an event cannot be focussed only on field
operators.
8
 "Entity" means a part of organisation more or less important in terms of size, staffîng. It could be a
small amount of people or even an isolated person (for instance a whistle blower).
3.6 Some Other Concepts of Organisational Analysis
Organisational and structural features are of importance to understand thé nature of
Accident Analysis. However, we could also take other dimensions into account.
Social sciences provide interesting findings to understand people's action in risky
situations. Spécial attention has to be paid during investigations/analyses to thé two
following issues. They are not thé only ones but seem of particular importance.
a) Weak signais
Notion of "weak signais" arose from Vaughan's work (1996). She defined a weak
signal as "information informai and/or ambiguous, so that threat to the flight safety9
was not clear". In other words, we can say that a weak signal is either a technical or a
human phenomenon which is not the/one direct cause of an event but which is
meaningful regarding potential weakness, fragility of thé socio-technical system in
domain of safety.
b) Whistle blowers
Sometimes "whistle blowers" make thé effort of writing to signal a malfunction and
express their concern for safety. Thèse written exchanges occur among some
operational staff-members, or their management, who sound thé alarm about
persistent malfunctions, thé treatment of which falls to others, and they often
underline thé accident-generating conséquences of thèse situations. Thèse persons
take their responsibility and also take risks through personal involvement, especially
regarding their careers. Their objective is to reach thé décision making centres in
order to remedy thé situation they are concerned with (Llory 1998).
3.7 Some Principles for Applying Organisational Analysis
a) Field Analysis
Even if an organisational analysis could be carried out from documentation (having
high quality), usually it is implemented through a field analysis with contacts with
every actor (operators, managers, ...) and with every entity (company where event
occurred, safety authority "in charge", ...). In order to collect "true" information
analysts hâve to hâve an empathie attitude toward people met during analysis10, and
to insure an understanding approach.
b) Background Knowledge
"We only find what we are looking for" ! !
An organisational analysis cannot do without a set of background knowledge related
to méthodologies, main findings of organisational approach. Indeed, as some root
9
 She spoke about thé Space Shuttle Challenger accident
10
 Collecting "true" information does not mean to take what it is said as "holly words". Analysts hâve
to understand speeches according to thé context, thé rôle of thé speaker(s), ... Information collected
hâve to be cross-examined as well.
causes could be "hidden" in thé past or by thé situation, analysis is based upon
assumptions to be confirmed or denied.
Background knowledge are a général framework for (fîeld) analysis and are usefui as
well for making a synthesis and for drawing conclusions.
Knowledge of day-to-day opérations is also part of background knowledge required
for an organisational analysis.
c) A "Thick" Description of An Event
First output of an organizational analysis is a "story" as detailed as possible which is,
as said Geertz (1998), a dense description, a thick description of the situation having
led to thé event. For synthesis, story is expurgated in order to highlight on thé one
hand main technical and organizational processes "responsible" and, on thé other
hand spécifie organisational factors involved in thé situation.
4. Analysts and Organisational Analysis
4.1 Historical and Sectorial Developments of Organisational Analysis
The understanding and explicit formalisation of thé human and organisational
dimensions of events and safety came with public reports upon some major accident
investigations and work of scholars. It implies that thé différent industrial sectors (and
in particular their analysts and thé available méthodologies) are at différent stages of
knowledge and practice of thèse new paradigms. Very recently, it seems that thé
CAIB report and posture constitutes a turning point on thé organisational paradigm.
This investigation has integrated some of thé latest developments proposed by
scholars, has used them explicitly and has criticised thé approach in other
investigations (too much focused on technical factors or human error oriented). This
investigation is producing a 'trickle down effect' (Vaughan 1996) on other sectors
such as in thé process industries with US CSB investigation (2007) of Texas City
accident and CCPS11 learning lessons process on thé Columbia case (2005). We can
see hère, thé important rôle of independent safety boards and independent ad-hoc
commissions in thé development of this paradigm. Some analysts in those sectors and
safety boards are now more familiar with those concepts.
4.2 Position of Analysts Within thé Organisation and Epistemological Barrier
It was shown by J. Rasmussen (1997) that several "layers" are involved in hazardous
processes -Work, Staff, Management, Company, Authority, Government. We assume
that causes of an accident could stem from flaws in several layers. Event analysts
usually belong to one layer. Their problem is to be able to detect and to take àccount
of thé whole set of event causes. For instance, CAIB (2003) showed that "American
political system" (i.e. thé White House and thé House of Représentatives) played a
rôle in loss of Columbia space shuttle in cutting down thé NASA budget. This budget
decreasing, with no parallel changes in thé goals of NASA led to staff downsizing,
1
 ' Center for Chemical Process Safety at http://www.aiche.org/CCPS/index.aspx
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time schedule pressure, ... which weakened thé "space shuttle system". Some root
causes of an event could be outside of the company "affected" by it. Could an analyst
or a team of analysts members of a company, be able to detect such root causes or are
they beyond their reach?
In addition "culture of efficiency" will lead analysts to emphasise on controllable and
manageable causes for which corrective measures are within thé organisation
boundaries analysts could reach. According to A. Hopkins (2003), analysts can be
driven by "stop rules" in their investigation. Study of several event analyses reveal
that often analysts implicitly hait searching causes to causes they handle, i.e. to causes
for which they can propose corrective measures in order to prevent them. That means,
for instance, if analysts belong to "management layer", they could "put aside" causes
implicating "company layer" because décisions concerning corrective measures hâve
to be made at thé corporate level. That is a reason why, very often, analyses do not go
far enough.
So, position of analysts within thé organisation influences their vision of situation and
therefore their analysis. It seems that, in order to take an event in its broad scope,
analysts hâve to be in position enabling them to catch thé "big picture" of thé event
and to catch thé comprehensive - organisational - situation prior to it.
Furthermore, position of thé analysts towards thé event, gives them implicit or
explicit goals for thé analysis. In other words, depending on position of analysts,
results of analysis could be tremendously unlike each other. Thus, Hopkins (2003)
shows, in analysing investigations carried out after an explosion in a gas plant in
Australia, that results, and therefore définition of causes, were différent according to
thé company owning thé plant and according to thé courts. In performing his own
investigation of this event, Hopkins figured out a third set of results, of root causes
having led to thé accident.
In addition and at thé basis also, Llory (1999) talked about an epistemological barrier
for some actors, in particular with engineers, to think about organisational dimensions
of accidents. The behaviourist model is still in mind to conceive thé human factors
despite thé fact that they can refer to organisational, communication problem to
explain some of thé situations they face. And at thé other end of thé socio-technical
System, thé justice also uses this underlying worldview.
4.3 Analysts as Political Actors
An event analysis can be sum-up as séries of decision-making (what is important,
what to look for, what to take account of, . . .) . Now, décision makers in any
organisation "are not perfectly rational individuals. They are collections of normal
human being, constrained by common cognitive and organizational limits on
rationality (Sagan 1994)".
Effects of organisation/company culture, self interests of analysts, ... can hâve an
impact on results of event investigation: " organizational blind spots can hid failures
10
modes. Organizations often hâve taboo subjects which cannot be discussed ,
because to do so hurts thé morale and self-image of the organization (Sagan 1994)".
Llory (1999) referring to Crozier (1995) analysing French failures of top décision
making "Obstacles are not only epistemological and cultural, they are grounded on
an organisational and hierarchical System that bans thé accountability of executive
élites13 ".
Does it lead to promote investigation carried out by "external" experts - in thé sensé
not belonging to organisation/company affected by thé event - ? It is not either thé
"pure" solution. Indeed external experts hâve also their limits to rationality. For
instance, Sagan (1994) refers to a study made by Hawkins showing that safety
"inspectors tend to report problems only when they believe there is a good chance
that they can win a case against thé violators, rather thon focusing on thé actual
effects on thé hazards."
This goes back to thé independence as a political factor facilitating thé tackling and
explicit formalisation of those political factors (organisational, hierarchical,
managerial, power, responsibility). However, there is no perfect situation as
addressed by Bourdeaux and Gilbert (1999): thé external (a priori more independent)
person will hâve less difficulties to ask questions not asked by thé insiders, and an
insider could hâve thé advantage of understanding thé power relationships. A way of
improving thé whole situation is to protect thé analyst, to institute thé bénéficiai rôle
of Cassandra's in high risk industries (Dien and Pierlot 2006) and look for analyst
with will not be complacent under contractual or hierarchical pressure.
4.4 Analysts and Organisational Data
Such organisational analysis requires spécifie methodological approaches, spécifie
data and resources, to conduct interviews, to analyse collected data, that are far from
thé resource allocation currently observed for incident analysis within industrial
organisation. This is a reason among others why, those analyses hâve often yet been
performed by scholars, researchers and independent safety boards or commissions.
Furthermore, thé access to thé needed data is not that obvious. As a first comment,
Llory (1996) pointed out in his book titled "Industrial accidents: thé Cost of Silence -
—Operators Deprived of Speech and Untraceable Managers". Most often, thé
accidents are not described from thé point of view of actors and thé work of managers
and experts is not described in those analyses. The technical factors of accidents are
politically more neutral.
Following an accident, an a posteriori assessment of the real work of actors should be
performed but is hard to conduct. First, this assessment is perceived as suspicious
according to thé risk with thé use of those information to allocate blâme, to find a
scapegoat and to assess individual performance of actors in human resources
perspective (de Gaulejac 2005). Indeed, it implies to address real work versus formai
12
 Emphasis added.
13
 of the country
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work which is a well known subject (Bourrier 1999). But in normative perspective in
this context, a secrecy culture is establishing (Llory 1999, Dejours 2003). In addition,
this access to real work assumes to hâve access to tacit skills and as stated by Dejours
(2003) "professional intelligence, in rule, is in advance on Us knowledge and
symbolisation". Spécifie methodological approaches to collect data hâve to be
practised, such as clinical approaches defined in social science. They are also facing
power dimension due to thé stratégie knowledge of thé real work (Crozier and
Friedberg 1977) and individual or group "défensive idéologies" (Llory 1999, Dejours
2003) that can be observed in particular after accidents, when actors are fearing
allocation of blâme or a responsibility towards thé justice litigation.
4.5 Sélection and Training of Analysts
Sélection and training of analysts is an issue that will hâve to be strengthened in thé
next years as we hâve not seen yet many actions regarding this dimension.
Organisational analyst compétence can be seen at thé intersection of two
competencies, thé first one in accident investigation (and by extension in learning
from expérience) and thé second one in human and organisational approaches of
safety.
In human and organisational dimensions of safety, différent sectors since thé eighties
hâve selected human factors specialist (ergonomics, psychology) following thé
impact of "human error" discovery ... Very few industrial organisation hâve
integrated more organisational dimensions expert (sociology political science, ...)
when thinking about safety management
In investigation and learning from expérience, despite this field of safety has been
implemented for several years, in France we know only one school on learning from
expérience and none on investigation. With thé independent accident investigation
boards, some developments are observed such with NTSB14 academy. However thé
training proposed are still more focused on technical dimension of investigations with
forensics techniques for example.
4.6 Transferring tools and methods on organisational analysis ?
One of thé issue that is underlying hère is thé gap between some knowledge of
scholars, researchers, and experts in thé field of organisational analysis and thé
industrial practices of incident analysis. An operational transfer of those concepts is
lacking (Bourrier 2004). Some perspectives of developing framework, approaches,
tools adapted to an industrial context with insights coming from lessons learned in
organisational analysis hâve been proposed (Bourrier 2004, Le Coze and Dechy
2006).
4.7 Accident Analysis: A Social Product and Analyst Sensé Making
As earlier mentioned, social sciences provide interesting findings to understand •
people's action in risky situations. This theoretical approach is worthwhile in terms of
14
 National Transportation Safety Board (USA).
12
accident prévention, based on a posture of doubt, critical analysis of knowledge
acquired and tools implanted. We consider Macrae's study (2007) as an interesting
way to explore and operate this notion. He argued that "in modem, complex and
hazardous organizations such as airlines, risks are rarely self-evident. They must be
actively identified and interpreted, often in a context rich with weak or equivocal
signs of potential problems'". Risk managers and experts hâve to try to pièce together
signs in order to give sensé to them. The capacity of analysts or safety managers to
detect, interpret and take thèse early signs of potential problems lies in a posture of
doubt; of learning from their own ignorance. In addition to thé necessary a posteriori
reconstruction of those processes, we believe that this approach could be of interest
for investigation a posteriori. Indeed, an issue to address is how this doubt prone
behaviour (gained during daily opérations and a priori analyses) could influence
analysts during an event investigation?
4.8 Analyst' Judgement and Memory of Analysis of Organisations
One of thé issue in organisational analysis (prior to thé event or after) is thé
judgement that arises after thé thick description and analysis when dealing with
fmdings. A posteriori, it is necessary to avoid both thé restropective bias as thé
historian and to avoid thé 'rétrospective illusion of fatality' (Llory, 1996, Llory et al.
2007). A priori, thé issue is to be able to judge complex factors, pathogenic factors
and latent conditions and detect an incubation period.
In both situations, a judgement as a conclusion of analysis is pronounced by thé
analyst. The judgement of complex factors (with feedback loops, non linearity,
counter-intuitive effects,...) is not trivial, even after thé event, and relies on
underlying assumption of models of safety), on a modelling of thé accident (thick
description provided by organisational analysis) and on accident cases to support
judgement. Indeed, thé médical metaphor was used by Llory (1996) to explain thé
need for référence cases to judge potential pathogenic conditions or behaviours of
dynamic socio-technical Systems. Furthermore, to study organisational pathogenic
patterns, Llory (1996), referring to S. Freund metaphor regarding dreams and
unconscious, has recalled that accident investigations are thé 'royal road' (versus
"normal" situations analyses) for understanding organisations.
5. Conclusions
It appears that use of organisational analysis for event investigation could break
current limits of OFS and improve safety since potential causes of incidents or
accidents are looked for in a wider scope than thé one of analysis methodology
generally used in industry.
One of thé issue, for thé methodological dimension, would be to work on doser
bridges between scholars and industries. In spite of many in depth studies on thèse
issues, many scholars still regret that accident analysis are too technical and not deep
enough. We could say that some efforts are still to make in thé capacity of scholars to
translate and transfer thé intellectual and practical tools to thé industries. This work
requires taking industrial constraints into account - production, people's background,
market conditions, ... If scholars and researchers tend to be doser to industries
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concems, bridges should be built in a more concrète and stronger way. It will imply
also serious sélection and training of analyst on those approaches.
Nevertheless, analysts either could not be able - i.e. to be in a "wrong" position
within organisation - to address thé whole scope or do not hâve self interest to extend
scope of investigation. They could also face difficulties to hâve access to relevant
organisational data and to make sensé of it.
Furthermore, practical corrective measures hâve to be derived from investigation and
they hâve to be implemented. However, some corrective measures are out of sphère
of compétence and responsibilities of persons in charge of drafting corrective
measures, and of persons in charge of decision-making regarding their
implementation. So, main improvements concerning effects of event investigations
hâve to be sought with future studies of position and rôle of analysts and of decision-
makers of implementation of corrective measures.
One promising, but expensive in terms of resource and time, is to promote a "check
and balance" approach for investigation, meaning a collective building of results
deriving from several parallel organisational analyses. Results of each analysis could
be compared and discussed in order to defïne one set of shared results allowing to
gain a "global vision" of the event. This approach could be worth for major accidents.
Références
Bourdeaux, I. et Gilbert, C. (1999). Procédures de REX, d'apprentissage et de
vigilance organisationnelles : approches croisées. Programme Risques
Collectifs et Situation de Crise, Éditions CNRS, Grenoble.
Bourrier, M. (1999), Le nucléaire à l'épreuve de l'organisation, PUF, Paris.
Bourrier, M. (2004), A la recherche d'un second souffle pour les facteurs humains et
organisationnels, Revue Contrôle n°160, Septembre 2004, édité par l'Autorité
de Sûreté Nucléaire.
CAIB (2003), Report Volume 1, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Washington DC.
Crozier.M, Friedberg.E, (1977) L'acteur et le système. Editions du Seuil.
Cullen, W. D. [Lord] (2000), The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry, Part 1 and Part 2
Reports, HSE Books, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Norwich.
Dechy, N. and Dien, Y. (2007) Les échecs du retour d'expérience dans l'industrie :
problèmes de verticalité et/ou de transversalité ? — Papiers de la conférence
IMdR - GRID des 13-14 décembre 2007 à Paris relative à la protection contre
la malveillance et l'information de gestion.
Dien, Y. (2006), Les facteurs organisationnels des accidents industriels, In : Magne,
L. et Vasseur, D. (Coordonnateurs), Risques industriels — Complexité,
incertitude et décision : une approche interdisciplinaire, p 133-174, Éditons
TED & DOC, Lavoisier, Paris.
14
Dien, Y. and Hofseth, C. (2005), Montée en température de l'Excitatrice de
l'alternateur le 17 mai 2004 : un événement inscrit dans l'organisation, EDF
R&D internai report Clamait
Dien, Y. and Llory, M. (2002), Première synthèse de la veille, EDF R&D internai
report Clamait.
Dien, Y. and Llory, M. (2004), Effects of the Columbia Space Shuttle Accident on
High Risk Industries or: Can We Learn Lessons from Other Industries?
Conference Hazards XVIII keynote paper, November 23-25, Manchester.
Dien, Y. and Llory, M. (2006), Méthode d'analyse et de diagnostic organisationnel
de la sûreté, EDF R&D internai report Clamait.
Dien, Y. and Pierlot, S. (2006) Cassandre au pays des risques modernes, Présentation
au 29ième Congrès National de Médecine et Santé au Travail à Lyon (30 mai-2 juin
2006).
Dejours, C. (2003) L'évaluation du travail à l'épreuve du réel, Inra. 2003. Collection,
Sciences En Questions.
Frantzen, C. (2004), Tango on Asymptote, 13* SRA-E Annual Conférence, November
15-17, Paris,
de Gaulejac, V. (2005) La société malade de la gestion, Seuil, Paris.
Geertz, C. (1998), La description dense, In : La description, tome I, Revue Enquête,
n°6, Editions Parenthèses, Marseille, p 73-105.
Hopkins, A. (2003), Lessons from Longford. The Esso Gas Plant Explosion, CCH
Australia Limited, Sydney, 7th Edition (I181 édition 2000).
INSAG (1991), Safety Culture, Safety Séries n°75-INSAG-4, IAEA, Vienna, Austria.
Lagadec, P. (1994), La gestion des crises, Ediscience international, 3eme édition,
Paris.
Laporte, T.R. and Consolini, P.M. (1991), Working in practice but not in theory:
theoretical challenges of "High-Reliability Organizations", Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, vol.1, n°l, p 19-47.
Le Coze, J-C. and Dechy, N. (2006), Stratégie de développement des approches
organisationnelles dans l'industrie. Actes du séminaire Saint André, 26-27
septembre.
Le Coze, J.-C. and Lim, S. (2003), Analyse organisationnelle de l'accident du 27
mars 2003 survenu à Billy-Berclau sur le site de Nitrochimie, Rapport
Annexe 5, INERIS DRA - JLz/SLi- 2003- 49 136, Verneuil en Hallate.
Llory, M. (1996), Accidents industriels : le coût du silence, Opérateurs privés de
parole et cadres introuvables, Éditions L'Harmattan, Paris.
Llory, M. (1998), Ce que nous apprennent les accidents industriels, Revue Générale
Nucléaire, vol. 1, janvier-février, Paris, p 63-68.
Llory, M. (1999), L'accident de la centrale nucléaire de Three Mile Island, Éditions
L'Harmattan, Paris.
Llory, M., Dien Y. Pierlot S. (2007) Les leçons des risques industriels : répétitions
insistantes et illusions rétrospectives, Papiers du colloque Risques industriels
majeurs, sciences humaines et sociales, Toulouse, 6-7 décembre 2007
15
Macrae, C. (2007), Interrogating thé unknown : Risk analysis and Sensé making in
Airline Safety Oversight, discussion paper, The Centre for Analysis of Risk
and Régulation.
Perrow, C. (1984), Normal Accidents. Living with High-Risk Technology, Basic
Books, New York.
Presidential Commission on thé Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (1986), Report to
thé Président by thé Presidential Commission on thé Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident, Government Printing Office, Washington DC.
Rasmussen, J. (1997), Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: A Modeling Problem,
Safety Science, Vol 27, n° 2/3, p 183-213.
Reason, J. (1990), The Age of Organisational Accident, Nuclear Engineering
International, n° 35, p l8-19.
Reason, J. (1993), Managing thé Management Risk: New Approaches to
Organisational Safety, In B. Wilpert, and T. Quale, Reliability and Safety in
Hazardous Work Systems, Hove Lawrence Erlbaum, p 7-22.
Reason, J. (1997), Managing thé Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate,
Aldershot.
Rochlin, G.I., Laporte, T.R. and Roberts, K.H. (1987), The self-designing high-
reliability organization: aircraft carrier flight opérations at sea, Naval War
Collège Review, p 76-90.
Sagan, S. (1994), Toward a Political Theory of Organizational Reliability, Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, vol. 2, n°4, p 228-240.
Turner, B. and Pidgeon, N. (1997), Man-Made Disasters, Second édition,
Butterworth Heinemann, Oxford [lrst édition: Turner, B. (1978), Wykeham
Publications].
U.S. CSB15 (2007), Investigation Report, Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP - Texas
City, Texas, March 23, 2005, Report N°2005-04-I-TX.
Vaughan, D. (1996), The Challenger Launch Décision. Risky Technology, Culture,
and Déviance at NASA, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Vaughan, D. (1997), The Trickle-down Effect: Policy Décisions, Risky Work, and thé
Challenger Tragedy, California Management Review, vol. 39, n° 2, p. 80-102.
Vaughan, D. (2005), System Effects: On Slippery Slopes, Repeating Négative
Pattems, and Learning from Mistake, In: Starbuck, W. and Farjoun, M. Edit.,
Organization at thé Limit. Lessons from thé Columbia Disaster, Blackwell
Publishing Ltd, Oxford.
Wilpert, B. and Fahlbruch, B. (1998), Safety Related Interventions in Mer-
Organisational Fields, In Haie A. and Baram M. Éditeurs, Safety
Management - The Challenge of Change, Pergamon, p 235-248.
15
 Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
16
